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SECTION ONE

FIRS'.r DAY
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Roanoke, Virginia
July 29, 1975

1.
Your client, Sam Driver, brings to you a motion for judgment which was filed and served on him on July 17, 1975, the body
of w~ich reads as follows:

'11' I

1.
The piaintiff, Roscoe Fleetwood, has duly qualified as administrator of the estate of Jim Wallace, deceased, in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville,
on the 8th day of July, 1975.
2.
Plaintiff moves the Court for a judgment against
the defendant Sam Driver for the sum of $75,830 for the
wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent caused by the said
defendant in that said defendant did negligently operate a
motor vehicle between Rugby Road and Vinegar Hill, in the
City of Charlottesville, Virginia, causing said motor
vehicle to strike and kill plaintiff's decedent who was
crossing Rugby Road.
Driver has

fi~ed

a demurrer to the motion for judgment.

How should the Court rule on the demurrer?
2.

Jane Horseman commenced an action against Horse Van Carrier,
the Circuit Court of Clarke County, Virginia, to recover dams in the sum of $100,000 for serious personal injuries sustained
plaintiff as a result of a collision between a car operated by her
a horse van operated by the defendant. l~t the conclusion. of
of the evidence and after receiving the instructions of the Court,
sel for plaintiff and defendant argued the case. During the
se of argument counsel for plaintiff said to the jury: "All Jane
eman asks you gentlemen to do when you retire to your jury room
o apply the Golden Rule - 'Do unto her as you wish that you would
ne.'" Counsel for defendant promptly objected to that statement
unsel for the plaintiff and, out of the hearing of the jury,
the Court to declare a mistrial, or in lieu thereof instruct
ury to disregard the argument as improper. The Court overruled
tion· for a mistrial, holding that the argument was proper. The
eturned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $65,000.
Y thereafter counsel for defendant moved the trial court to set
diet aside claiming that the Court erred in overruling de' s motion for a mistrial, or, in the alternative, in failing to
.t the jury to disregard the argument as improper. The trial
9verruled the motion and exception was noted. Defendant filed
ion with the Supreme Court of Virginia for a writ of error and
t Was granted.
The only assignment of error was the action of
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the Court in refusing to grant a mistrial, or, in lieu thereof, in
failing to instruct the jury to disregard the argument as improper.
Should the Supreme Court affirm the trial court
or reverse that Court and remand the case for a
new trial?
.,

3o
William Houseman, a citizen of Tennessee, on May 7, 1975,
sued John Gardener, a citizen of Virginia, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, to obtain specific
performance of an alleged contract for the sale of a farm, "Green
Acres," which was owned by Gardener and was situate in Albemarle
County, Virginia, and to recover damages in the sum of $25,000 for
the alleged breach of the contract by Gardener. Gardener filed an
answer in which he merely denied the averments contained in the complaint, i.e., he denied that he entered into a contract with Houseman
by which he agreed to sell the farm, "Green Acres," and he further
denied that he was guilty of a breach of contract, as charged in the
complaint, which would entitle Houseman to recover damages. No other
pleadings were filed by the plaintiff or defendant. During the trial
of the case Houseman proved: that on May 5, 1971, he and Gardener
orally agreed that Gardener would sell to Houseman "Green Acres" for
he sum of $150,000; that a deed for the farm would be delivered to
ouseman by Gardener the 1st day of June, 1971, and that the purchase
rice would be paid on the date of delivery of the deed; that Gardener
efused to deliver a deed for the farm on June 1, 1971, as agreed,
.'!:though Houseman then tendered payment of $150,000 to Gardener by
~tified check; that on a number of occasions thereafter Houseman
anded that Gardener deliver him a deed and accept payment of the
chase price but Gardener refused in each instance; and that Househad sustained a loss of $25,000 be0ause he had been denied possion of the farm and was unatlc to make a profit from the operap thereof. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by Houseman,
pener moved the Court for summary judgment on the grounds (a) that
action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (b) that the
ract was oral and therefore unenforceable because of the statute
rauds.

How should the Court rule on each ground of the
motion?
Jimmy Cc1r:ryaway was indicted in the Circuit Court of Prince
9m County, Virginia, on a charge of breaking and entering with
ntent to commit larceny. Promptly upon the return of the indict.~arryaway was arraigned on the indictment and entered a plea of
ilty. He was tried on the indictment at the next regular
f the Court, was found guilty and sentenced to five years in
ate penitentiary. After serving one year in the state peniten-
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tiary, Carryaway, by his attorney, filed a petition in the Circuit
court of Prince William County praying that a writ of habeas corpus
be issued and that he be discharged from custody. In his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus Carryaway charged that during the trial
on the indictment the Court erred in admitting, over his objection,
the result of a lie detector test, and that the Court also, over his
objection, admitted into evidence hearsay evidence that was material
in establishing his guilt of the offense charged in the indictment.
At the hearing on the petition, the petitioner proved that he had
submitted to a lie detector test and that the result tended to prove
his guilt. He also proved that the witness introduced by the Commonwealth was permitted to testify that he heard Joe Booze say that
he saw the defendant open a closed window of the house that he was
charged with entering and that he saw him enter the house and return
through the window with some valuable silverware. The petitioner
also proved at that hearing that his attorney strongly objected to
the admission of all of that evidence, and that the Court overruled
,the objection. The Commonwealth offered no evidence at the hearing
n the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
On a motion by the Attorney for the Commonwealth
to strike the petitioner's evidence and to deny
the writ of habeas corpus, hew should the Court
rule?
5.
Herbert Nickels obtained a judgment for $5,000 against
ert Payne in the Circuit Court of Mathews county, Virginia. Robert
he and his brother John were tenants in common of sixty acres of
erland in Mathews County which realty had a fair market value of
1000. Shortly after his judgment was docketed, Nickels brought a
in equity in the Circuit Court of Mathews County against Robert
ohn Payne to partition the timberland. The bill recited the
ent against Robert Payne, recited that Robert and John Payne were
hts in common of the timberland, recited that rents and profits
the timberland would not satisfy the lien of the judgment within
years, prayed that the timberland be partitioned by sale, and
er prayed that Nickels' judgment be satisfied out of that portion
sale price allotted to Robert Payne. After the parties were at
a stipulation was entered into and filed in the cause by
s, Robert Payne and John Payne. By the stipulation, it was
that Robert Payne had marketable personal property in Mathews
worth $6,000. · John Payne thereupon filed a motion that the
~ismiss Nickels 1 bill for partition asserting as the grounds
r; (a) that Nickels was not entitled to relief by a partition
timberland until he had exhausted his remedy to satisfy his
~ out of the personal property of Robert Payne, and (b) that
,could not properly proceed to satisfy his judgment by parof the timberland because John Payne was a co-owner of the
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Page Four
realty and was not a debtor of Nickels.
Should the Court sustain John Payne's motion on
either, or both, of the grounds asserted?
6.
Top-Service Taxi Corp. is engaged in business in the City
of Richmond. Top-Service employs no drivers and owns no taxicabs,
but receives orders for service from prospective passengers. It
puts its sign "Top-Service Taxi Corp." on cabs which are owned and
operated by independent drivers, each of whom pays Top-Service a
mileage fee for each passenger Top-Service refers to the driver.
After receiving a telephone call for cab service from Cecil Jones,
Top-Service caused one of the independent drivers to pick him up.
While transporting Jones, the driver carelessly collided with
Walter Brown's automobile, damaging it and seriously injuring Jones.
What liability, if any, does Top-Service have for:
(a)

the injuries to Jones; and

(b)

the damage to Brown's automobile.

7.
John Lacy is a resident of Knoxville. Tennessee, and is
e owner of approximately 5,000 acres of land situated in the New
ver Valley in the State of Virginia. In 1973 the General Assembly
Virginia enacted a statute authorizing the State Engineer to
nstruct a dam on New River at a point one mile downstream from
land of Lacy, the completed dam to be of such height as to flood
than one-half of Lacy's land. The construction of the dam has
completed and Lacy 9 s land has been flooded. Although demanded
acy, the Treasurer of the State of Virginia has refused to pay
for resulting damage on the ground that the statute makes no
ision for compensation to those adversely affected by the dam.
has brought an action against the Treasurer and the State of
inia in the United States District Court for the Western Distr.ict
irginia. His complaint alleges the foregoing faats, and seeks
es in the amount of $300,000. The Treasurer and the State of
~ia have moved to dismiss Lacy's complaint on the ground that
ils to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
How should the Court rule on the motion?
Thomas Swan rented a safety box in the vault of First State
the City of Fairfax. On December 27, 1974 Swan went to the
deposit stock certificates in his safety box. After being
d to the vault, and after depositing his certificates, Swan
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found lying on the floor of the vault a negotiable bearer bond of
the City of Richmond in the face amount of $5,000 payable on June
30, 1981. Swan picked up the bond and, seeing it did not recite the
name of the owner, left the vault and went directly to the office of
the President of the Bank. There he told the President what had occurred, and delivered the bond to the President only after being
promised by the latter that, should the owner not call for the bond
or become known by June 30, 1975, the Bank would redeliver the bond
to Swan. On July 1, 1975, Swan learned that the owner of the bond
had not called for it or become known to the Bank. Swan then asked
that the bond be returned to him. The Bank refused to do so, saying
it would continue to hold the bond until it learned the identity of
the owner. Swan has now brought an action in detinue against the
Bank in the Circuit Court of the City of Fairfax to recover possession
of the bond. The President of the Bank consults you and, after reciting the foregoing facts, asks whether the Bank has the right to
retain possession of the bond.
What should your advice be?
Delta Construction Company entered into a contract in July
erect a building for Grove Department Store for $100,000 to
when the building was completed. The contract contained a
inding provision requiring that any disputes between the parties
ould be submitted to arbitration. By May 15, 1975, Delta had com.lated fifty percent of the work on the building. At that time a
'spute arose regarding subsurface conditions. Delta walked off the
oject and refused to participate in arbitration. Shortly there· ter Third Party secured a judgment against Delta for $10,000. When
lta failed to pay the judgment, Third Party sought to collect it
om Grove through a garnishment proceeding on the theory that Delta
~ld be entitled to collect considerably more from Grove than the
0,000 Delta owed Third Party.
Is Third Party entitled to collect $10,000
from Grove in the garnishment proceeding?

O.
Paul alleged in his bill of complaint filed in the Circuit
t of Warren County, Virginia, that he had entered into a "supd marriage" with Winona upon her representation that she had
lawfully divorced from her former husband, Joe; that following
ceremony, and in the honest belief that they were lawfully mar., Paul purchased certain real property in Warren County and
d it to be conveyed to him and his supposed wife as tenants by
ntirety with the right of survivorship; that subsequently he
d that Winona had not been lawfully divorced from her former
d; and that although she had obtained a decree of divorce from
rmer husband in the Circuit Court of Henry County, Virginia,
ecree was void for want of jurisdiction because neither Winona
r husband had been domiciled in, or a bona fide resident of,
ate of Virginia for at least six months next preceding the
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commencement of the suit as required by the Virginia Code. Paul
prayed that the "supposed marriage" be declared a nullity and that
Winona be compelled to convey to him all of her interest in the
real property.
Winona filed a demurrer in which she asserted that Paul's
suit against her was a collateral attack on the decree of divorce
by the Circuit Court of Henry County and that Paul had no legal right
to make such an attack since he was a stranger to the divorce proceedings. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer and entered a decree
dismissing the complaint.
In an appeal by Paul, how should the Supreme Court
of Virginia rule?

SECTION TWO

FIRST DAY
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Roanoke, Virginia
July 29, 1975

1.
Ben Skid of Reidsville, North Carolina, was driving his
Oldsmobile cautiously in Henry County, Virginia, when a Dodge
Charger rounded a curve at an excessive speed and crossed into
Skid's lane. Although Skid slammed on his brakes, turned to his
right and was pulling off the road, his car was clipped by Charycr,
causing serious personal injuries to Skid. He was not able to ascertain the indentity of the driver or owner of the Charger which
continued down the road. Skid's automobile insurance policy had
been issued in North Carolina and it contained an uninsured motorist endorsement required by a North Carolina statute, which, contrary to the laws of Virginia, provided in part:

'I'

"Where the insured, under the uninsured
motorist coverage, claims that he has sustained bodily injury as the result of collision between motor vehicles and asserts that
the identity of the operator or owner of a
vehicle (other than a vehicle in which the
insured is a passenger) cannot be ascertained,
the insured may institute an action directly
against the insurer ••• "
Skid hired a North Carolina attorney, who, not impressed
Skid's appearance, checked into his background and found that
Skid was Reidsville's foremost derelict with a reputation for never
elling the truth. Skid 1 s attorney feels that in an action between
n insurance company and Skid, Skid would elicit more sympathy, but
hat Skid would never prevail in an action against John Doe. The
orth Carolina attorney consults you and inquires as to whether
id may in accordance with the North Carolina statute bring an
tion directly against his insurance company in the Circuit Court
Henr~ County.
d t 3 ~r;. ,) 31
a (:_ f<-t Yi 'Jl?C'--<;1u be .Df\. c1.Cp\ t..J - .... ,
How ought you to advise him?
1
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World of Color Television Store agreed in writing on
~o f\!C
e 20, 11 1975, to sell Consumer a particular television set "on h• ~nt\t' \
roval with a provision that Consumer must decide within te~1
fr'.t \i(v.
~ from that date whether to keep the set or not.
Consumer
ked up the set on June 20th, installed it in his home and began
hing his favorite programs. Unbeknownst to World of Color,
umer's creditors had been "hounding" him for some months. One

I
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of them had an execution issued on a judgment previously obtained
and directed the Sheriff to levy on the television set.
(a)
Assuming World of Color took no steps to perfect a
security interest in the set, would Consumer's creditor prevail
under a levy made by the Sheriff within the ten-qay ~~;iod but
prior to Consumer's dec~sion to acc.ep~ th,e s.et:? ~ -3,,.d-·(z} .
.,, < ,.<:r.111.

,:;h·.J/' Jv.icf
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(b) Assume in the foregoing question that before the
Sheriff had an opportunity to levy on the television set an unexpected and unprecedented flash flood completely destroyed the
set by flooding Consumer's basement recreation room during the tenday period but before Consumer had accepted the seto As between
World of Color and Consumer, which party suffered the loss? . / <',/Cc u_,..__
{j::.71- ;J.-:327(1)
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3.
Thomas Pate was the owner of Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and of
10 feet of Lot 7 adjoining Lot 6, in Section 24, of Grandview Farms,
a fashionable subdivision of Salem. Pate desired to sell his property. Upon learning that Ronald Jones was interested in purchasing
this property, Pate went to see Jones, and they entered into an oral
agreement for the sale of the property to Jones at the price of
$26,000.
Pate and Jones went to the off ice of Lawyer Trent where
Pate instructed Trent to prepare a deed from him and his wife to
Jones, conveying all of the above described real estate. Trent inadvertently omitted to include the 10 feet of Lot 7 adjoining Lot 6
4n the deed from Pate and his wife to Jones. This omission was not
:aticed by either Pate or Jones at the time the deed was signed by
ate and his wife and delivered to Jones, who then paid the full
urchase price.
Six months after the deed had been duly recorded and rerned to him, Jones noticed for the first time that the 10 feet of
t 7 was not included in the deed, and immediately had Lawyer Trent
epare another deed conveying the 10-feet wide strip and presented
to Pate and his wife fcir execution. In the meantime real estate
ues in Grandview Farms had increased dramatically, and Page, feelthat he had sold the property too cheaply, refused to execute
deed conveying the 10-feet wide strip of Lot 7, although he adted that it had been his intention to convey this strip along
h the other lots.
Jones now consults you, recites the foreqoing factG and
What, if any, remedies he may have against Pate.

'
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4.
On January 23, 1975, Jane Dickson, an elderly spinster,
died in Abingdon, leaving as her heirs at law two sisters and a
brother, William Dickson. The brother, William, and Miss Dickson
had resided together in the latter's home for many years prior to
the latter's death. Jane Dickson's will, which was entirely in
her own handwriting, was admitted to probate in the Clerk's Office
of the Circuit Court of Washington county, and reads as follows:
"Abingdon, Virginia, June 22, 1968.
"This is my last will and testament.
"I appoint my brother, William Dickson, as Executor
and Trustee of my estate.
"To my brother, William Dickson, I present herewith
and without recourse tho acc~mp~nying bonds, stocks,
mortgage notes, real estate, bank accounts and valuables
of all description in my safe deposit box at Second National Bank of Abingdon, or at any other place where,
same may be found at the time of my death.
"My brother knows my wishes and will carry them
out to the best of his ability.
Signed - Jane Dickson"
Thereafter, William Dickson qualified as Executor of Jane
Dickson's will. When Jane's surviving sisters learned thnt William
was claiming the entire estate, they instituted a suit in chancery
against William in the Circuit Court of Washington County, asserting
that under the terms of Jane Dickson's will, she intended to create
a trust for undesignated beneficiaries and unspecified purposes
which must fail for indefiniteness and, therefore, her estate should
be held by William as Trustee under a resulting trust for the benefit of her heirs at law. William filed his answer to the bill of
ornplaint, asserting that he was entitled to the entire estate to
he exclusion of Jane Dickson's other heirs. Lu~ ·sJ~ ..<lihctt... :$ .,~11/10~Whct construction should the Court give to
Jane Dickson's will?
5.
John Brooks, a resident of Carroll County, died testate
May 3, 1955, survived by his wife, Mary, but without issue. His
11 was duly probated in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of
rroll County on May 12, 1955. Clause Three of his will provides:
"I give and devise unto my wife, Mary, my farm
known as 'Pleasant Hills' for and during her
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life, and after the decease of my wife, Mary,
I give and devise in fee simple the tract or
parcel of land above described and known as
'Pleasant Hills' to the youngest son of my
sister, Susan Brown."
At the time of the death of John Brooks, James Brown was
the youngest son of the testator's sister, Susan Brown, but James
Brown died intestate in 1969 leaving as his heirs his wife, Nancy
Brown, and two children, John Brooks Brown and Sarah Brown. Mary
Brooks died on May 3, 1975, at which time George Brown was the
youngest living son of the testator's sister, Susan Brown.
George Brown instituted a suit in the Circuit Court of
Carroll County against the widow and heirs at law of James Brown,
asking the aid of the Court in construing the will of John Brooks
and asserting that since his younger brother, James Brown, had died
prior to the death of the life tenant, Mary, his interest in
"Pleasant Hills" was divested at his death and that he, George Brown,
became vested with the property upon the death of the testator's .-"1
wife, Mary Brooks.
,,, \ \
I) \ )

What should be the Court's construction of Clause
Three of the John Brooks will?

r

6. Barrister had unsuccessfully defended Prisoner on an indictment charging the latter with murder in the Circuit Court of
Russell County in 1974.
Prisoner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the Circuit Court of Russell County in February, 1975, alleging his
constitutional rights had been violated in that he had not had the
benefit of competent counsel. In support of this allegation,
Prisoner's petition specifically asserted that he had told Barrister that one of the jurors on the panel was prejudiced against
him by reason of various disagreements, lawsuits and fights; and
that Barrister had refused to question the named juror concerning
such incidents or to even eliminate such juror by preemptory strike.
As a matter of fact, when the list of prospective jurors
being reviewed with him, Prisoner had advised Barrister that
his particular juror was a frimrl of: his e.nd insisted that he be left
n the panel.

~as

Shortly after the filing of Prisoner's petition for writ
habeas corpus, the Commonwealth's Attorney of Russell County
Ubpoenaed Barrister to testify at the hearing on the petition. While
n the stand, the Commonwealth's Atoorney asked Barrister to reveal
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the communications which Prisoner had made to him relative to the
juror referred to in the petition. Prisoner objected tp the question.
t/-/0/ /awy-ec.Jit.'J. &;'f~d-'-"''<· » .lf-'e·(/'f·/t ~:._:·J.~~~:t«. 1 : . • •
What should be the Court's ruling on Prisone;' s /:",'';.~uf t:fJtz~,
objection?
(,•/[//':}~/~/((,

,rd

7.
T executed a subscription of 100 shares of the stock of
Corporation at $50 par value per share. He paid $1,000 at the
time of the subscription and the balance was deferred by agreement
to the call of the Board of Directors. N Corporation became insolvent and John Doe, one of its creditors, filed suit against T demanding that he pay a judgment in the amount of $3,000 which Doe had obtained against the N Corporation. T defended, alleging no privity
of contract with Doe and no obligation to pay such a, sum.

nf ·N
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Are his defenses valid?
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8.
Torn Timid purchased a new car from Dan Dealer in the
course of which he signed a promissory note for the unpaid balance
of the purchase price. The note was attached to a sales contract
and was to cover the balance of the purchase price, license fees
and certain additional equipment specified by Timid. As the price
of certain extra equipment was not available locally, Timid signed
the note with the amount to filled in by Dealer, who assured him
that the total amount of the note would not exceed $3,700. After
all prices were obtained, Dealer completed the note and sent Timid
a copy. He explained that the total indebtedness shown on the note,
$3,975, was more than contemplated because equipment prices had
risen.
~
f ,,27c-c
Timid consul ts you as to whether he must pay (rvv~ r , ;;/Z.1.Pt - ,
the note.
•-i Jl v..-lH'- ''
f i/..- l l!
L Cl (. u,{< t l c

I-

9.

The City of Richmond decided that, instead of

i

''-l(D)
,)' .,. .J

buildin~

ew junior high school, it would completely remodel an existing
tructure.

a

In connection therewith it issued invitations for bids ·

pr a central heating and air conditioning unit powered by solar

ergy. The specifications were closely tailored to a unit manuctured and distributed by SunAir, Inc. which had been in success1 operation in school buildings in the southwest part of the
untry for about five years. The bidding documents required the
ader to furnish, install and for a period of 20 years to maintain
~ equipment.
The specifications contained the following provision:
"The City may roject any and all proposals, waive
any informalities or irregularities in the proposals received and may accept that proposal which
in its judgment best serves the interest of the City."

1
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The City received three bids in response to the invitation: One from SunAir, Inc. citing an installation and delivery
cost of $83,640 with delivery scheduled in six months; one from
Eastinghouse, Inc. with delivery and installation costs of $81,500
and delivery in one year; and one from TempMaster, Inc. with delivery and installation costs of $62,300 and a delivery scheduled
in 15 months. In addition, each bid outlined the services it proposed to furnish in maintaining the equipment and each bidder provided a similar guarantee. The City of Richmond employed an engineer to evaluate the bids, after which he recommended that the City
accept the bid submitted by SunAir, Inc. as being in the overall
best interest of the City, bearing in mind the reliability of the
equipment, the time of delivery, and the cost and.reliability of
the proposed maintenance as required in the bid documents.
TempMaster, which was a new company with an innovative approach to temperature controls and the use of solar energy, but
which had no equipment actually operating in any building similar
i~~o a junior high school, filed a petition in the Circuit Court of
v
the City of Richmond praying that a writ of mandamus be issued comJ pelling the City Manager to award the contract to TempMaster as
. Lthe lowest bidder and ordering the City Manager not to execute a
~"' contract with SunAir.
How should the Court rule on the petition?
'•

10.
The United States purchased a tract of land in Nottaway
County adjoining Camp Pickett. Subsequently, it leased the property
for a term of 40 years to Pickett Gardens, Inc., a private corporation, which agreed to construct thereon and to operate a housing
project for the military. The lease provided that upon its termination the United States would be entitled to possession of the entire
project with all improvenents.
Upon completion of construction of the housing project,
Nottaway County assessed the lessee with real estate taxes on the
buildings. Lessee paid the taxes under protest and instituted proceedings to recover the payment in the Circuit Court of Nottaway
pounty on the basis that the project was immune from taxation.
Should the lessee prevail?

I

